The world could lose America as we know it if Trump wins the presidency
Donald Trump may well win the next US election and Europe must be prepared for that eventuality, argues Michael O’Sullivan.
March 4, 2024, has been set as the date set for Donald Trump’s arraignment in Georgia, and it may become the focal point for US politics.
The worry is not so much that Mr Trump is declared guilty, or innocent, but that in the Republican primaries that follow the court case and in the court of public opinion, a large number of Americans declare him to be their champion.
It is not impossible that Mr Trump is sent to prison and wins the 2024 presidency from there (to my knowledge, the US constitution does not prohibit anyone who has been convicted, indicted or in jail, from running and becoming president, though constitutional lawyers and potentially Congress might try to use the 14th amendment to bar him from holding office).
As always, the only winners will be the lawyers, and perhaps the media (Twitter, or X as it is now known, will soon allow paid political ads).
Beyond the US
My interest is what the reaction of the world beyond America could be to its potential descent towards a deep civil schism and, if opinion polls are to be believed, a presidential candidate who has vandalised all of the sacred, historical tents of US democracy. A victory for Trump is one thing, but an American public that detonates the foundations of the US is quite something else. We would lose America as we know it.
The relevant point is that with March 4 set as the date for the Trump trial, other countries, notably the autocracies, are already preparing for a difficult period for US democracy (as are many in Washington), and the possibility of a highly controversial year in American politics.
Some European leaders like Emmanuel Macron, who has plenty of experience with Mr Trump, have already flagged the risks of the above scenario, but other European states like Ireland are so deeply tied to the US that the shock would be enormous.
European leaders have already contended with Trump and indeed, with a range of policy surprises from the Biden White House (for example the Inflation Reduction Act or the so-called Aukus security pact between the US, UK and Australia) but in general working relations between Washington and Paris/Brussels/Berlin are good now.
In general, Europe has risen (slowly) to meet the challenge of autocrats (European foreign, security, enlargement and industrial policy have changed dramatically in response to Russia), though it could be all the more decisive with Hungary's Viktor Orban. ‘Losing America’ as we know it would be chilling, but some governments and policy experts in Europe are beginning to brainstorm this possibility and there is a long list of ‘to dos’.
Autocratic economies are faring much worse than democratic ones, a trend that highlights the first risk of a popular wave of support for Mr Trump, that its consequences could lead to a loss of faith in US financial assets. Imagine if Mr Trump declared that the US had no obligations to the overseas holders of its debt, or ordered the US Navy to occupy Greenland.
The euro and European government debt might likely become more of a safe haven asset, some wealthy Americans might move to Europe and the UK, and the difficulty of running economic and foreign policy in the US may well mean a period of heightened uncertainty is ahead.
Early mover
Geopolitically, Europe may want to pre-empt some of the risks associated with this scenario by eradicating as best as it can Russian influence within European countries like Germany and Austria, and in my view should take a much more severe stance on Hungary’s government. Poland, which holds elections in October, will be a vital cog in this setup, as will the Baltic states. A more aggressive stance would be to surge military support for Ukraine, across different domains (cyber, financial, hard weapons).
Operationally, Europe also needs to accelerate and deepen the implementation of its Economic Security Act and to bolster it with much greater, and more ruthless resourcing of banking and payments oversight. The coming US election will make the risk-focused EU AI Act look sensible, especially as the use of artificial intelligence in social media and politics is concerned (though the act won’t be in force by then).
In this respect, even the threat of another Trump presidency could be the forcing element that defines the multipolar era, when Europe finally realises that it must rely on its own resources – as it is increasingly doing. There would likely be little change in Europe’s relationship with China, which is based on ‘de-risking’ rather than ‘de-coupling’.
If this scenario comes to pass, we will badly miss America as we know it, but there is no excuse for this outcome being a surprise.
Michael O’Sullivan is author of ‘The Levelling – what’s next after globalization?’ Follow him @levellingbook
