AMOUNT (E) FUND
25,000 eb.rexx Gov. Germany 1.5-2.5 yrs (euro bond, short term)
12,000 eb.rexx Gov. Germany 2.5-5.5 yrs (euro bond, medium term)
7,500 Allianz-dit High Dividend Discount (European certificate funds, alt. investments)
7,500 MainFirst avant-garde (Europe equity, large cap growth)
7,500 Schroder Euro Dynamic Growth (Europe equity, large cap growth)
5,000 BlackRock Merrill Lynch US Growth (US equity, large cap growth)
5,000 OP Hedge Multi Strategies Plus (fund-of-hedge funds, alt.
investments)
5,000 OP Value European Equities (Europe equity, large cap value)
5,000 UBS (Lux.) European Opportunities (Europe equity, large cap blend)
4,000 DWS Bonuszertifikate (European certificate funds, alt. invest ments)
4,000 HSBC Trinkaus Aktienstrukturen Europa (European certificate funds, alt. investments)
2,500 AXA Rosenberg Japan Equ. Alpha (Japan equity, large cap blend)
2,500 eb.rexx Gov. Germany 5.5-10.5 yrs (euro bond, long term)
2,500 Janus Intech US Risk Managed Core (US equity, large cap growth)
2,500 Templeton Asian Growth (Asian ex Japan equity, large cap value)
2,500 WIP Pramerica US Value (US equity, large cap value)
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Christoph Hott
01 May, 2008
“Generally a successful fund manager is rewarded for past performance by huge inflows once the “community” recognises the excellence of the fund, leading to an upward market movement. A recent example is the Schroders Euro Dynamic Growth fund. But when things start to worsen and the first investors start to take profits, the fund manager is forced to liquidate large positions of illiquid names, driving prices down. More investors then decide to sell the fund. Exactly this has happened with the Schroders fund since the summer 2007, and the spiral only ended recently. Remarkably the relative performance immediately improved to previous levels as soon as there were no major net outflows.” |
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